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rAbstract
This note examines the balance of activation strategies in OECD countries, where this
type of policy approach has a long tradition. Countries share the objective of
strengthening employment and reducing benefit dependency and vulnerability
among the working-age population, but the balance of policy measures differs
widely. While debates on the effectiveness of active labour market policies have
tended to focus on individual policy measures, this paper emphasizes the links
between policy areas. We argue that an effective policy strategy rests on a finely
tuned balance between income support, work incentives, as well as mutual
obligations and active labour market programmes.
Jel codes: H31, H53, J08, J681. Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of OECD countries have introduced or reinforced
strategies to “activate” the unemployed and other benefit recipients, hereafter called
“activation strategies”. These strategies varied significantly across the board, depending
on underlying labour market conditions and the capacity of public employment ser-
vices. However, the main features of the activation strategies include the enforcement
of strict eligibility criteria for benefit recipients together with the provision of effective
re-employment services. At the same time, governments have made efforts to encour-
age economic self-sufficiency while supporting the living standards of low-income fam-
ilies, by providing different forms of in-work benefits.
Evidence suggests that, if well-designed, such strategies have contributed to better
labour market outcomes, by ensuring that benefit recipients have a better chance of
obtaining employment and minimising the risks that high and/or long-lasting benefits
significantly damage work incentives (Reassessment of the OECD Jobs Strategy in
OECD, 2006a; OECD 2005).
countries. 1 They comprise measures that:
i. Strengthen people’s motivation to look for and make use of existing earnings
opportunities (e.g., work incentives, job-search requirements and benefit
sanctions);
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capabilities of jobseekers and other policy “clients” (e.g., training and employment
rehabilitation); and
iii. Expand the set of earnings opportunities that are available and accessible to
jobseekers and those with limited income from work (labour-market intermediation
and programmes that support labour demand through wage subsidies or direct job
creation).
While activation strategies were generally launched in the OECD countries in the
1990s with the aim of combating high and often persistent unemployment, their effect-
iveness in mobilising the unemployed and other benefit recipients was evaluated in par-
ticular in the decade prior to the Great Recession of 2007–08 – a period in which
many countries enjoyed relatively strong economic growth and buoyant labour demand
and thus when the number of jobseekers was low relative to the number of vacancies.
Early activation measures focused on specific groups facing labour-market difficulties
in a context of relatively strong overall labour-market performance (such as low-skilled
urban youth). More recently, activation principles have been extended to cover a wider
range of population groups, and increasingly in a co-ordinated manner across policy
domains.
With a rapidly growing number of jobseekers and low labour demand, the recent fi-
nancial and economic crisis has exposed activation strategies to a hard test. Re-
employment services and other active labour market programmes, (ALMPs, hence-
forth) had to be scaled up to provide support to the greater number of jobseekers; and
activation procedures had to be adapted to ensure that jobseekers receive the appropri-
ate supports. While resources for ALMPs have increased in response to the crisis, often
more than in previous major downturns (OECD 2012), spending per unemployed has
generally declined significantly. This has meant fewer resources available to support
jobseekers at a time when their chances of quick reintegration into work were weaker
given the limited number of vacancies and high competition among the unemployed.
In this context, policy-makers are facing daunting trade-offs. On the one hand, fiscal
consolidation efforts require containing public spending, including for labour market
programmes. On the other hand, early successes with activation strategies suggest that
they can contribute significantly to mobilise benefit recipients back into employment,
which is key both for reducing benefit spending, and for shoring up government reven-
ues now and in the longer term. In addition, the downturn has pushed up the numbers
of people living in “low-work intensity” households requiring support, and this has
heightened concerns about inequality trends and the situation of the poorest families in
particular. In restoring incomes at the bottom, a key policy challenge is therefore to fa-
cilitate employment and earnings growth that benefits low-income groups. Moreover,
longer-term trends also point to a greater role for activation policies. In most of the
OECD area, population ageing and the associated pressures on social expenditure bud-
gets make active labour-market participation of working-age individuals a necessary in-
gredient of policies that seek to restore the fiscal sustainability of social protection
systems.
The paper reviews different elements of the activation strategies adopted by OECD
countries and discusses what works under different underlying labour market
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paper considers benefit generosity and work incentives (Section 3); eligibility conditions
and obligations of job seekers and benefit recipients (Section 4); and ALMPs (Section
5). Section 6 characterizes aspects of countries’ overall policy stance by discussing the
balance of policies and links between them.2. Key features of activation strategies
Activation strategies are generally implemented at the local level by the Public
Employment Service (PES), 2 in some cases with the support of private providers of job
placement and training services. Actions are generally targeted at people of working
age who are not in work, but who could potentially work and are in receipt of an
income-replacement benefit, usually an unemployment benefit but sometimes a social
assistance, single parent or disability benefit. They make benefit payments conditional
on compliance with employment- and job-search related requirements.
Different specific actions are included in the activation strategies depending on
labour market conditions but also the capacity of the PES and other service providers.
As part of job-search assistance and monitoring, most OECD countries follow a prac-
tice of intensive obligatory interviews between the jobseeker and an employment
counsellor. However, the frequency of such interviews varies, with five OECD requiring
an interview on a monthly basis or less (Czech Republic, France, Korea, Slovak Repub-
lic and the UK). Beneficiaries are also required to report regularly on their job-search
effort, while the PES refers unemployed clients to vacant jobs. The PES also sets up
back-to-work agreements or individual action plans as the joblessness spell lengthens
and offer tailored re-employment programmes to prevent loss of motivation, skills and
employability. In a few countries – Australia, Denmark, Sweden and the UK – partici-
pation in re-employment programmes is compulsory after a period of unsuccessful job
search to reduce the risk of either long-term unemployment or labour market exit.
The impact of these strategies on unemployment arises partly because they ensure
that jobseekers participate in employment-related services, and partly because the par-
ticipation requirements and monitoring of compliance with eligibility conditions,
backed up by the threat of temporary financial sanctions, counteract potential disincen-
tives from the payment of benefits.
Activation strategies were primarily developed for people receiving an income-
replacement benefit, to enforce a principle of “mutual obligation” and contain the risks
of benefit dependency, loss of human capital among the long-term unemployed and,
ultimately, higher public spending on labour market and social policies. Elements of
these strategies typically originated in countries with longer-lasting or indefinite-
duration insurance or assistance benefits for job seekers. By contrast, countries that pay
relatively short-duration UI benefits often associate these with only relatively light
activation measures.
Some social assistance (or minimum-income) benefit systems distinguish between
employable and non-employable recipients. For the former group, work-availability
requirements apply. Moreover, in a number of countries workers in low-paid jobs re-
ceive in-work benefits, or social assistance benefits at a reduced rate, depending on
benefit system parameters. To the extent this occurs, some activation elements – with
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required – may still apply. Finally, employment services can also be made available to
jobseekers who do not receive financial support. For these policy clients, enforcing job-
search and work-availability is more difficult, but arguably also less relevant as those
participating voluntarily are likely to be motivated to look for a employment.
Over the past few decades many countries have experienced a sharp increase in re-
cipiency rates for incapacity benefits, lone-parent benefits, non-categorised social assist-
ance benefits or other types of out-of-work benefit. While recipients of such benefits
may face specific employment barriers, many of them can work, and they have grad-
ually become another target group for labour market policies. 3 Activation strategies
for labour-market inactive benefit recipients may involve making benefits for a particu-
lar target group conditional on immediate availability for work and acceptance of refer-
rals to job vacancies, either by transferring them to an existing unemployment benefit
or converting their benefit de facto into a type of unemployment benefit. For those with
limited work capacity, requirements can include participation in “work preparation” or
rehabilitation measures.3. Financial work incentives: benefit generosity and make-work-pay policies
A key factor justifying well-designed activation strategies or “back-to-work” policies is
the concern about adverse work incentives that may result if out-of-work benefits are
“close” to the income a benefit recipient might otherwise earn in the labour market.
Benefit generosity, as well as the tax treatment of in-work and out-of-work incomes in-
deed vary widely across countries. It is therefore useful to consider the extent of ad-
verse work incentives in some detail (summary tables of the main policy features of
unemployment and other benefits can be accessed through www.oecd.org/els/social/
workincentives).
Unemployment benefits
For those entitled to unemployment benefits, one simple way of summarising many of the
relevant policy parameters is by means of benefit replacement rates, which express net in-
come of a beneficiary as percentages of net income in a previous job. Table 1 shows bene-
fit replacement rates for different stages of the unemployment spell for prime-age
individuals. 4 Results are averages over different earnings levels and family situations and
account for taxes and for family-related benefits that are typically available.
During the first year of unemployment, prime-age workers entitled to unemployment
benefits had net incomes above 60% in just under half of the countries. Income losses
during the first year were smallest in Nordic countries and in continental Europe. On
the other end of the spectrum, unemployed entitled to benefits but with no other sup-
port in Czech Republic, Korea, Slovak Republic faced income losses of more than 60%
during the first year of unemployment.
In countries operating insurance benefits, net replacement rates typically decline
during the unemployment spell. For instance, prime-age long-term unemployed in
Japan, Italy, Korea, Turkey and several other countries lose their entire unemployment
benefit after 12 months or less (prior to recent crisis-related extensions of benefit
duration, unemployment insurance benefits in the United States also expired after 26
Table 1 Generosity of unemployment benefits at different points during an
unemployment spell
Year1 Year2 Year3 Year4 Year5 Five year average
Belgium 71.4 64.5 64.5 64.5 64.5 65.8
Ireland 63.8 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9 63.9
Austria 62.1 58.9 58.9 58.9 58.9 59.6
New Zealand 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5 49.5
Australia 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.4 47.4
Portugal 76. 76.1 54.4 24.1 4.6 47.1
Germany 64.4 47.5 41.3 35.0 35.0 44.7
France 66.9 66.9 28.8 28.8 28.8 44.0
Finland 61.7 58.5 31.8 31.8 31.8 43.1
Sweden 60.2 58.7 55.6 19.2 7.7 40.3
Norway 73.2 73.5 18.0 17.5 17.5 39.9
Spain 68.4 64.7 23.5 23.5 12.8 38.5
Iceland (b) 59.3 54.6 54.6 7.7 7.7 36.8
Denmark 74.1 74.1 9.6 9.6 9.6 35.4
Netherlands 73.0 61.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 30.0
United Kingdom 31.2 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.5 29.8
Canada 62.4 17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1 26.2
Switzerland 83.0 41.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 24.9
Luxembourg 85.5 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 24.4
Slovenia 56.8 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.8 20.8
United States 51.0 46.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.4
Hungary 44.4 10.1 10.1 10.1 10.1 17.0
Poland 46.9 8.6 8.6 8.6 8.6 16.2
Slovak Republic 37.6 10.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 15.9
Japan 48.1 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 14.0
Estonia 50.1 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 13.7
Greece 46.8 8.9 4.0 4.0 4.0 13.6
Czech Republic 30.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 12.8
Israel 44.3 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 11.0
Italy 45.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0
Turkey 40.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.1
Korea 29.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 6.3
OECD (average) 56.4 35.5 22.8 19.0 17.7 30.3
Net replacement rates in percent, 2010 policy parameters a.
a. Countries shown in descending order of the five-year average. Calculations consider cash incomes (including family
benefit, which may be available regardless of employment status or income) as well as income taxes and mandatory
social security contributions payable by workers. To focus on the role of unemployment benefits, no social assistance or
housing-related benefits are considered (see Figure 1 for “all-in” replacement rates including these safety-net benefits)
and any entitlements to severance payments are also excluded. Net replacement rates are for a prime-age worker (aged
40) with a “long” and uninterrupted employment record and are averages over 12 months, four different stylised family
types (single and one-earner couples, with and without children) and two earnings levels (67% and 100% of average full-
time wage).
b. Excluding the retroactive extension of unemployment benefits from three to four years which was passed in
December 2010.
Source: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives).
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payable in the second year of unemployment, although families with children can be
entitled to child benefits and other family support payments, which maintain a small
amount of income for those without any other support. In a number of countries, means-
tested unemployment assistance provides continued (and usually lower) benefit entitle-
ments once insurance benefits expire (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Portugal,
Spain) and four English-speaking countries operate unlimited means-tested unemployment
assistance benefits (Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom), resulting in a flat
replacement-rate profile.
Other financial support for low-income groups
Housing benefits, as well as social assistance and other benefits of last resort, are important
additional components of the overall support package, especially for those running out of
unemployment benefit entitlements. Cash rent assistance as well as minimum-income or
“welfare” benefits provide a fall-back option for people not, or no longer, receiving
unemployment compensation, and an income top-up for others with low incomes.
This is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows replacement rates for someone
actually receiving these safety-net benefits. But, as argued below, social safety nets
are often relatively poorly targeted, in the sense that they reach only a small proportion
of the low-income population.
Make-work-pay policies
The twin objectives of supporting the living standards of low-income families and en-











Unemployment benefits only Social assistance and housing benefits: possible additional entitlements
Figure 1 Social safety nets are important complements to unemployment benefits. Net replacement
rates resulting from 2010 policy parameters, in percent. Notes: See Table 1 for calculation details. “Social
assistance” refers to minimum-income transfers. In the United States it also includes the value of a near-
cash benefit (“Food Stamps”). Housing-related cash benefits are those intended to cover rent, utilities and
associated housing-related expenses. Benefits shown are the maximum amounts to which a family may
typically be entitled if there is no other income. Source: OECD tax-benefit models (www.oecd.org/els/social/
workincentives).
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improving the terms of this trade-off by accentuating financial work incentives while
maintaining adequate support for those with no or very low earnings. Today, practically
all OECD countries operate such “make-work-pay” policies of one form or another.
 Most countries operate gradual benefit phase-outs for individuals who manage to
earn only limited amounts (e.g., by working a few hours while looking for a higher-
paying job). Disregarding a certain amount of earnings in the income test, or ignoring
marginal working hours in the eligibility test of out-of-work benefits, can provide
strong incentives to supplement benefit income with a small amount of earnings and
to seek or maintain at least some link with the labour market, e.g., in the form of
marginal employment of a few hours a week. But, often, they do not provide a genuine
incentive to increase employment incomes further; steep benefit phase-outs further up
the earnings scale, combined with relatively high tax or social contribution burdens for
non-marginal workers can mean that earning more “does not pay” (for instance,
OECD calculations indicate that the net income of a German single parent is about
the same whether she earns 15% or 60% of the average wage). 5 In this way, it is
possible that in-work benefits can act as a disincentive for low-wage workers to work
longer hours or invest in their human capital.
 Partly to address these problems, an increasing number of countries are considering
employment-conditional (or “in-work”) benefits or tax credits that support the
incomes of workers in non-marginal employment. 6 A few countries “make work pay”
by successfully keeping employees’ income tax and/or contribution burdens low (most
Anglo-Saxon countries, Korea, or the Slovak Republic). In-work benefits often go
beyond that by reducing tax burdens below zero for some groups (i.e., the benefit or
tax credit exceeds tax/contribution burdens). Depending on how in-work benefits are
targeted, they can result in much-improved incentives for non-marginal employment
for some groups. In some countries, “transitional” in-work benefits are paid only for a
limited period following new employment in a qualifying job (e.g., Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Ireland, Japan, Korea and the Slovak Republic).How important are financial incentives for employment outcomes?
Even though results are not available for all OECD countries, there exists a relatively
broad consensus among labour economists on the responsiveness of people’s employ-
ment decisions to financial work incentives, such as the net income gain of working
one hour more or of working at all. Among the main findings are the following: 7 Financial incentives affect overall labour supply mainly through their influence on
labour force participation (i.e., the decision on whether or not to work), while changes
in the number of hours worked are quantitatively less important;
 Low-income groups and lone parents react more strongly to financial incentives; and
 Labour supply is more responsive (or “elastic”) for women than for men.
These results are important when considering the potential economic cost of
reforming out-of-work support programs. They also provide essential guidance for
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targeting these resources on women and low-income groups, especially when children
are present, is likely to create the biggest payoff in terms of stronger employment and
higher earnings).
But while some general patterns emerge from the international evidence, it is
notable that there are widespread differences across countries. For instance, one
of the few available cross-country empirical studies reports that single women in
Hungary and Poland are only about 1/4 as responsive to financial incentives as in
Ireland and the United Kingdom. 8 One important reason for these large country
differences is that financial incentives may have limited effects on observed em-
ployment outcomes if other barriers prevent people from adjusting their labour-
market status or working hours. For instance, when involuntary unemployment is
high during a downturn, many individuals who want to work cannot find a job,
or they cannot work as many hours as they would like. Frictions in the labour
market (e.g., due to poorly functioning public employment services) can have
similar effects. On the other hand, policies that tie benefit receipt to job-search or
participation in ALMPs can help to avoid negative employment effects that may
result from unconditional out-of-work benefits.4. Eligibility criteria and obligations of job seekers and benefit recipients
Simple “textbook” economic models of labour-supply decisions and job search consider
out-of-work benefit levels as a de-facto wage floor. In these models, benefit replacement
rates assume a central role since wage floors are the main factor determining people’s
decision to work and exert job-search efforts. In reality, benefit receipt is not simply a
choice but is associated with more or less well defined – and more or less demanding
– eligibility conditions. Some of these conditions exclude certain individuals from the
group of potential benefit recipients altogether. These provisions, which are sometimes
referred to as entitlement conditions, serve as an initial “filter” that targets support
measures to certain groups. For instance, individuals with short or interrupted employ-
ment records may not be eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, while those
with assets may not qualify for means-tested benefits.
In addition, those entitled to receive a benefit in principle may have to comply with
specific behavioural requirements which are an integral part of activation strategies,
namely, job-search activities, participating in interviews and ALMPs and accepting suit-
able job offers. These requirements tend to make continued benefit receipt costly for
those who are not genuinely seeking to overcome benefit dependency; they act as a
“stick” or “hassle” factor in pushing benefit recipients to meet their obligations.
Because of these costs of claiming benefits, the provision or strengthening of out-
of-work support does not necessarily have to translate into reduced job-search
efforts. 9 Well-defined eligibility conditions can therefore help to ease any trade-
offs between adequate out-of-work benefits and maintaining strong labour-market
performance.
The importance of entitlement conditions, and the costs associated with benefit re-
ceipt, becomes clearer when considering the share of jobseekers who actually receive
benefits. Although survey questions differ and data are therefore not fully comparable
across countries, labour force surveys do provide some evidence on benefit coverage
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employed Germans and Belgians were in receipt of unemployment benefits in the mid-
2000s. But in most countries, coverage rates were much lower. In Italy, Slovakia,
Poland, Greece, Estonia and the United States, fewer than one in five job-seekers (those
reporting to be available for work and actively looking for a job) received unemploy-
ment benefits. 11
Over the time period shown, the shares of unemployed reporting benefit receipt
have dropped in more than two thirds of countries, while only a few recorded sig-
nificant increases. 12 There can be different reasons for these trends, and not all
have to do with the strictness of entitlement or eligibility criteria. A closer analysis
of the coverage data suggests that shortening average employment spells and
reduced employment stability are likely drivers of falling benefit coverage. 13 In
some but not all OECD countries, a growing incidence of temporary employment
and other types of non-standard work have caused growing shares of workers to
remain unprotected (coverage rates decline if entitlement conditions fail to adjust
to accommodate rising numbers of non-standard workers). In addition some coun-
tries pursuing an activation agenda have tightened conditions, reduced benefit
durations, or introduced more demanding behavioural requirements (Immervoll
and Richardson, 2011).How demanding are eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits?
The OECD and other analysts have consistently argued that job-search incentives and
requirements can have a significant effect on aggregate unemployment, especially when
benefit spells are long (e.g., OECD 2006b). This view is consistent, for example, with
the large (25-50%) caseload reductions following welfare-to-work type reforms in the
United States, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. To assess countries’
policies in this area, this section reproduces selected results from a joint project be-
tween the OECD and the European Commission that collected qualitative information










percent of ILO unemployed
Figure 2 Unemployment benefit coverage percent of ILO unemployed. Note: Calculations based on
administrative data can give different magnitudes of coverage rates than the survey-based measures
reported here. Reasons include both measurement issues and conceptual differences (e.g., because the
number of people registered with the employment service as unemployed may, depending on
administrative norms and practices, be much higher or much lower than the number unemployed as
reported in the labour force survey). See Grubb et al. (2009). Source: Immervoll and Richardson (2011) using
European Labour Force Surveys and Current Population Survey (US).
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ness”, each with one or more sub-categories as follows:
1. Entitlement conditionsa. employment/contribution requirements
b. sanctions for “voluntary” unemployment2. Job-search requirementsa. Availability requirements during participation in ALMPs
b. Suitability of job offers: Required occupational mobility
c. Suitability of job offers: Required geographic mobility
d. Suitability of job offers: Other valid reasons for refusing a job offer3. Monitoring of job-search activitiesa. Proof of job-search activity4. Sanctions for failing to comply with behavioural requirementsa. Sanctions for refusing to accept a suitable job or participation in mandatory
labour market program
b. Sanctions for repeated refusal of a job or the participation in a labour market
programFigure 3 reports the overall strictness score. 14 In 2011, formal eligibility conditions
for unemployment benefits were rated least strict in Sweden, Canada, Austria, Cyprus
and Finland. It is notable that countries with the most demanding eligibility criteria
(e.g., Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) tend to have strict rules in each of the
four sub-categories. Yet, overall, Venn (2012) finds little cross-country correlation
between the different aspects of eligibility strictness. For instance, the pattern across
countries does not support the idea that countries trade off individual aspects of eligibility
strictness against one another.
Formal eligibility criteria are clearly important – both for job seekers, and for under-
standing countries’ activation stance. Ultimately, however, the impact of formal rules
strongly depends on how they are implemented in practice. For instance, Grubb (2000)
argues that the formal strictness of legislation is often an unreliable guide as to its ac-
tual impact on job-search behavior: they can be formulated in very general terms and
case managers in local PES offices may exercise considerable discretion when applying
them to individual clients. 15 This applies even more strongly in the case of lower-tier
out-of-work benefits (such as minimum-income transfers). 16
Capacity constraints are crucial as well. Redesigning formal rules may produce little
effect in practice if public employment services (PES) do not have the capacity to man-
age frequent contact with benefit recipients, or are otherwise unable to monitor job-


















































































































































































Job-search and availability Entitlement conditions
Figure 3 Unemployment benefits: Strictness of formal eligibility rules, 2011. Note: Higher scores for
more demanding eligibility criteria. See text for definitions, measurement and calculation details. Source:
Adapted from Venn (2012).
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employment services are able to carry out their legal monitoring and support
mandates.
5. Active labour market programmes
Overall spending levels
Spending for active labour market programmes varies significantly across OECD coun-
tries, as does its composition across different measures. Spending as a share of GDP
ranges from 0.15% to 0.20% in the US and Japan, respectively on the one end of the
spectrum, to around 1% in France, Germany and 1.5% or more in the Nordic countries.
As shown in Figure 4 for a selected group of countries, differences across countries in
the level of spending for active labour market programmes are not closely related to
the level of unemployment. While there is correlation between the spending on “pas-
sive” income support – as many job losers are entitled to unemployment benefits and
other forms of income support– this is not the case for active spending, which in most
countries is discretionary. 17
It is also noticeable that, while spending on income support is strongly counter-cyc-
lical, spending on active programmes tends to react only moderately in most countries,
with the notable exception of the Nordic countries (Figure 5, upper panel). The lack of
strong responsiveness means that, in most countries, spending per unemployed person
tends to decline significantly as unemployment rises during cyclical downturns
(Figure 5, lower panel). 18 This implies that it becomes more difficult to service job see-
kers effectively. During periods of extended labour-market weakness, as in the weak re-
covery after the 2008–09 Great Recession, falling resources per jobseeker can be a
particular concern as independent job-search is more difficult when unemployment is














Total spending in 2007
Total spending in 2010
Active spending in 2007
Active spending in 2010
Unemployment rate in 2007 (right-side scale)
Unemployment rate in 2010 (right-side scale)
Figure 4 Unemployment rates and labour market programme spending as a percentage of GDP,
2007-10. Note: Countries are shown in ascending order of the unemployment rate in 2010; 2009 for the
United Kingdom. Source: OECD calculations based on the OECD Main Economic Indicators and OECD
Labour Market Programmes Databases.
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countries show the highest spending levels. Continental European countries have, how-
ever, narrowed the gap and, as a group, spend only slightly less. English-speaking as
well as Eastern European OECD countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia)
devote the smallest amount of resources to ALMPs, but with opposing trends:
spending per unemployed has gone up in the past 10 years, while it has declined
in English-speaking countries.
What types of labour market programmes do countries prioritise?
The core matching functions of the PES (“job brokering”: placement and job-search as-
sistance) form a fundamental pillar of active labour market policy. Yet, Figure 6 shows
that the majority of public ALMP expenditures goes towards programmes that seek to
address specific employability issues. 19 In countries with comparatively high overall
spending, core PES functions (including job-matching services delivered by private pro-
viders but with public financing) typically account for less than 25% of total ALMP
resources, and just over 10% in the “Nordic” group. In English-speaking countries, PES
spending shares have gone up as total expenditures have declined. In these countries,
programs such as training and wage subsidies drove falling ALMP spending levels,
while core PES functions were largely protected from spending cuts.
Other than the cost of running the PES, training is the largest spending category in
most countries, accounting for one fourth to one third of total spending. However, in
Eastern Europe, training measures account for only slightly more than 10% of ALMP
expenditures, and English-speaking countries now spend much less on training than
they did in 1990. Across the OECD area as a whole, job subsidies and other demand-
side employment incentives have tended to grow as a spending item, while direct job
creation (e.g., public works programs) have seen declining expenditure shares. Start-up
incentives for new businesses are only a small part of total spending (but werevery siz-
able during the early transition phase in Eastern Europe). Finally, increasing spending
shares in the “disability” category (including supported employment and rehabilitation)
reflect a growing awareness of sickness and disability as a major labour-market issue.
aggregate, in percent of GDP
per unemployed person, in percent of GDP per capita























































































































































Figure 5 Spending on active labour market programs. (a) aggregate, in percent of GDP. (b) per
unemployed person, in percent of GDP per capita. Note: Greece, Italy, Japan and Korea are not included in
the figure due to incomplete time series data. At the time of writing, spending data were not available for
Turkey. Sources: OECD Labour Market Program Database and OECD Labour Force Statistics and author’s
calculations.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/9Do active labour market programmes “work”?
There exists a large evaluation literature for OECD countries, and a number of high-
quality reviews or meta-studies (e.g., Card et al., 2010; Greenberg et al., 2003; OECD,
2005). One general finding is that the impact varies substantially between different
types of program but, perhaps more surprisingly, also between different studies looking
at the same policy category. In part, this can be explained by different methodologies
and outcome measures. But the impact heterogeneity remains even after controlling for
the outcome measure. For instance, without distinguishing by type of program, Card
et al. (2010) report statistically significant positive short-term effects on employment
(12 months after start of program) for just over 40% of the close to 200 evaluation
studies they review. Around 30% find significantly negative employment effects, and a
further 30% show no discernable effect. The number of studies finding negative effects
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Figure 6 Active labour market policies: Spending by policy area prior to the economic downturn.
Note: For country coverage, see notes to Figure 5. Definitions, comparability and limitations are discussed in
Grubb and Puymoyen (2008) and in the Statistical Annex of the OECD Employment Outlook (http://www.
oecd.org/dataoecd/49/50/38803588.pdf). Source: OECD Labour Market Program Database.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/9representative and powerful in a statistical sense as fewer studies look at medium-term
outcomes beyond one year.
There is less variation across groups of countries. On one hand, this would suggest
that there may be no strong reason why ALMPs should work less well in some coun-
tries than in others. On the other hand, even in the OECD area, there remains a signifi-
cant imbalance in terms of the countries covered in evaluation studies. For instance, of
the estimates studied by Card et al., 23% are from Germany, 13% from Denmark, 10%
from Sweden and 7% from France. As a result, there is no strong basis for making
inferences about the effectiveness of programmes in countries that are not included, or
under-represented, in the sample of available studies.
Subject to these limitations, training measures are generally found to have a positive im-
pact on employment. However, these are not evident immediately after a training pro-
gram, but take time to manifest themselves. They also tend to be small or insignificant for
men and for programmes delivering basic education, while on-the-job training appears to
perform best. Public-sector job creation programmes have mostly produced negative
labour-market effects (based on assessments after the program has ended). Evidence on
private-sector employment subsidies does not give a strong indication either way, with
some studies finding positive and others negative effects (displacement/substitution as
well as deadweight effects can be very large, although appropriate targeting can reduce
these costs). Results are also not conclusive for self-employment support and start-up
incentives as there are few evaluations (and take-up tends to be very low).
One limitation of most studies is that they evaluate individual programmes rather
than broader activation strategies. As a result, they cannot account for important inter-
actions between policy areas (e.g., between a training program and the enforcement of
requirements to participate in the program), which are indeed the essence of activation.
Another important consideration when interpreting impact evaluations is that pro-
grammes will often impact outcomes other than employment. For instance, even with
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direct job creation might be justified as emergency measures during periods of very
high unemployment designed to maintain morale and links to the labour market. Simi-
larly, from an equity perspective, displacement effects are not necessarily a primary
concern if a program successfully strengthens employment among the target group. In
general, there is, however, still very limited information on the distributional effects of
different policies, and even less systematic evaluation of possible equity-efficiency
trade-offs (which can for instance arise if strict sanctions increase employment and
poverty at the same time). An assessment of distributional effects is especially relevant
when policy measures, such as strict benefit sanctions, are targeted towards highly dis-
advantaged groups.5. Overall policy stance on activation and employment support
The discussion above suggests that activation and employment supports are best seen
as a package of policy tools, including financial incentives, obligations of job seekers,
and programmes that address specific employment barriers on the supply and demand
side. To characterise countries’ overall activation stance, it is useful to examine how
they differ in terms of the balance of these different measures.
Figure 7 shows two scatter plots of the indicators presented earlier. Taken at face
value, there is no indication that benefit eligibility is generally particularly strict in
countries with generous out-of-work benefit amounts (left-hand panel). On the basis of
these metrics, eligibility conditions are indeed more demanding in some countries with
high net replacement rates (e.g., Slovenia and Portugal), but a number of countries with
even more generous out-of-work benefits have fairly light requirements (Canada,
Sweden, Austria and Finland). On the other end of the spectrum, benefits in Turkey, Italy,
Romania, Estonia and Slovakia are both low and subject to demanding eligibility condi-
tions. Overall, there is no correlation between the two measures: Some countries may seek
to offset possible work disincentives of generous benefits (the clients’ “rights”) with rela-
tively demanding client responsibilities. In others, such a link is not obvious and benefits
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Figure 7 Balance between different activation policy measures. Prior to the economic downturn (2007
or latest available). Note: See notes to Figure 6. Sources: See Figures 2, 4 and 5.
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strong non-linear correlation across countries (right-hand panel of Figure 7). Active
policy “effort”, as proxied by ALMP spending, tends to be greater in countries where
out-of-work benefits are generous (in part, the correlation is driven by the data points
for Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy; but it remains strong even when these three
countries are excluded).
Using a similar country regression approach, Venn (2012) finds that ALMP spending
is negatively correlated with eligibility strictness. That study also explores links between
some of the sub-indicators that are used to construct the summary measures of benefit
generosity and eligibility strictness. According to those results, strict entitlement condi-
tions are associated with shorter benefit durations and lower expenditures on PES and
training programmes. Countries with more rigorous benefit sanctions also spend less
on ALMPs, notably on PES. Finally, Venn reports that strict job-search and availability
requirements coexist with more generous benefits.6. Conclusions
Although knowledge gaps remain, the experience of a number of OECD countries pro-
vides useful pointers for other advanced as well as many emerging and possibly
middle-income countries seeking to mobilise benefit recipients back into employment.
One uncontroversial conclusion from a review of existing evidence is that well-
designed policies can have a positive impact on employment outcomes for participants.
Moreover, the effect of individual policies is strengthened if they are part of a coherent
activation strategy in which income support is combined with effective re-employment
services tailored to the needs of different beneficiaries. Activation strategies also require
significant resources and administrative capacity by public employment services and
close coordination of these services with other social services.
It should also be stressed that the implementation of activation strategies in OECD
countries has generally involved significant changes in labour market policy institu-
tions, legislation, and management principles, as well as in the design of specific pro-
grammes. This has taken time and often required experimentation and testing. But
much remains to be done to provide systematic evaluations of co-ordinated policy
packages that are the essence of activation strategies. Evaluations of such packages are
complicated and much of the literature focuses instead on the effectiveness of specific
measures on individuals’ labour market outcomes, thereby failing to capture potentially
sizeable interactions. As part of a sustained policy commitment to activation, system-
atic monitoring and evaluation are needed that take into account possible synergies be-
tween individual policy elements and help to assess which individual programmes
might work best if employed as a package in combination with other measures.
In fact, the impact of individual programmes on aggregate employment or benefi-
ciary caseloads is often fairly modest. This is not necessarily surprising and need not be
discouraging given that most programmes are highly targeted, investment of public
resources is limited and program durations are short. But it also suggests that there is
scope for better co-ordination between policy domains. In part, such co-ordination can
be achieved by customizing policy parameters of individual measures. For instance, job-
search incentives and requirements should arguably be co-ordinated with the provision
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can increase participation in employment services. To the extent that these services are
effective, this should result in better employment prospects, and a possible virtuous
cycle of reduced caseloads and improving service quality.
The large impact of the Great Recession on the labour market of many OECD coun-
tries and the modest – if any – improvements in the weak and uncertain recovery in
most of them, coupled with the need to tackle large fiscal imbalances, have renewed
interest in the role of activation and employment support policies. When fewer vacan-
cies render an effective matching of jobs and jobseekers more difficult, there are good
arguments for making, more than ever, adequately resourced labour-market intermedi-
ation a policy priority. But in the current environment employers tend to be very se-
lective in their hiring strategies, making it difficult to place some job seekers into jobs
quickly. Training programmes and even publically-subsidised work-experience pro-
grammes can help prevent this group from becoming discouraged and detached, while
preparing them to take advantage of new job opportunities once job creation picks up.
But indeed a vigorous recovery in employment is key to tackle the current large imbal-
ances in the labour market. Activation and employment support are best seen as
“greasing the wheels” of the labour market. Programmes that ease efficient job realloca-
tion improve labour market outcomes irrespective of the economic cycle. They are,
however, not a substitute for job creation.Endnotes
1The scope is largely limited to prime-age recipients of unemployment and
minimum-income benefits. Policies for the disabled, for youth and for older jobless
people raise additional issues that a short note cannot address properly. Readers are re-
ferred to www.oecd.org/els/disability, to OECD (2010) and to OECD (2006c) for discus-
sions of these specific issues.
2Australia is a notable exception where since 1998 job matching and other employ-
ment assistance serviceshave been subcontracted to hundreds of private and commu-
nity organisations.
3See e.g. OECD (2007) for a review of reforms aimed at ensuring that people with
partial work capacity remain in or enter the labour market in Australia, Denmark,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.
4In response to rising unemployment, a number of countries – including Canada,
Iceland, Italy, and the United States have temporarily made unemployment compensa-
tion more generous.
5For a lone parent with two children entitled to the Unemployment Benefit II
minimum-income transfer (see the family budget-set calculations on http://www.oecd.
org/els/socialpoliciesanddata/benefitsandwagescountryspecificinformation.htm).
6See Immervoll and Pearson (2009).
7A survey of results from around 40 studies is provided by Evers et al. (2008) and by
Immervoll et al. (2007)
8Bargain and Peichl, (2011).
9See Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006 for a survey of theoretical models of job
search.
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/910Immervoll et al., 2004 (Section 3) provide details on the questions used in the dif-
ferent surveys, and discuss comparability issues. Some of these issues are probably less
problematic when the main interest is in changes over time rather than across
countries.
11These data refer mostly to unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance
benefits. Behavioural requirements and other barriers (such as the perceived burden of
filing an application) are equally relevant for potential recipients of minimum-income
or “welfare” benefits. Cross-nationally comparable coverage data are not available for
these benefits of last-resort. But studies on benefit take-up regularly find very high
non-take-up rates for means-tested benefits in the order of 40% or more, indicating
that the deterrent effect of the various barriers combined is indeed significant (Bargain
et al., 2011; Hernanz et al., 2004).
12Including in Germany, where a merger in 2005 of social assistance and unemploy-
ment assistance into the new means-tested Unemployment Benefit II has considerably
widened the scope of unemployment benefits. However, the increase shown in the
figure is not a net effect as the reform has, at the same time, reduced the number of
people receiving social assistance.
13Other possible explanations are less plausible (see Immervoll and Richardson
2011). For instance, coverage rates have generally moved in the same direction for
those with and without prior work experience, so the patterns cannot be explained by a
simple change in the composition of the unemployed group such as a greater number
of youth unemployed (who are less likely to meet meeting relevant employment or con-
tribution conditions). Across countries, a changing incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment is also not a plausible explanation of declining benefit coverage: Between the
mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, the proportion of long-term unemployment fell signifi-
cantly in most countries, with 53 percent (36 percent) unemployed over 6 (12) months
in 1994, and 45 percent (32 percent) in 2006 on average in the OECD area.
14The qualitative information on each of those sub-categories was translated into
scores ranging from one (least strict) to five (most strict). The scores were combined
into a simple composite indicator using equal weights for each of the four main head-
ings, and equal weights for each of the sub-categories. Venn (2012) explores the sensi-
tivity of the overall strictness indicator to the choice of weights concluding that
country rankings remain broadly unaffected.
15Ireland is a good example of this: according to Figure 3, it has an above-average
strictness, yet Grubb et al. (2009) show that this was true only on paper before the
2008 reform that introduced the National Employment Action Plan.
16Partly for this reason, lower-tier minimum-income programs are not considered in
the overview of formal eligibility rules presented in Venn (2012). Typically, these bene-
fit programs are the responsibility of regions or municipalities and legal rules regarding
eligibility criteria and sanctions vary between localities and/or take the form of broad
guidelines that leave room for interpretation. Subject to these caveats, Immervoll
(2009) summarises available information on formal eligibility rules and sanction
provisions.
17In Denmark and Switzerland, spending on active programmes is closely related to
the level of unemployment as participation in re-employment programmes is a right
and a duty after a certain duration of the joblessness spell and adequate resources are
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http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/9earmarked in the budget every year depending on the expected evolution in
unemployment.
18In the 2008–09 economic downturn, spending for active labour market programs
responded more strongly to the rise in unemployment compared with previous down-
turn, but on average across the OECD countries spending per unemployed declined by
20% (see OECD, Employment Outlook, OECD 2012). Concerning Figure 5, it should
be stressed that during the past ten years, two other OECD members – Japan and
Korea – have spent less on ALMPs than English-speaking countries, although this is
also related to their relatively lower unemployment rates. Unlike the latter group of
countries, Japan and Korea have, however, been able to significantly scale up spending
per unemployed during the most recent economic crisis.
19Spending data are influenced by national institutional arrangements and reporting
standards and country comparisons are therefore not straightforward. For instance, a
minority of countries may report administration costs of active programs in the PES
category (see note to Figure 6).
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declare
that they have observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
We thank John Martin and the anonymous referee for useful comments. We also thank participants of a conference
on activation and employment support policies held on April 30 – May 1, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey, where elements of
this paper were presented. The views in this paper are the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the official positions
of the organisations to which they are affiliated.
Responsible editor: Juan Francisco Jimeno
Author details
1World Bank, Washington, DC, U.S. 2IZA, Bonn, Germany. 3OECD, Paris, France.
Received: 1 October 2012 Accepted: 15 October 2012
Published: 18 December 2012
References
Bargain O, Immervoll H, Viitamäki H (2011) “No claim, No pain. Measuring the Non-take-up of social assistance using
register data”. J Econ Inequal
Bargain O, Peichl A (2011) “Labor supply elasticities in Europe and the US”, IZA discussion paper No. 5820
Card D, Kluve J, Weber A (2010) Active labour market policy evaluations: a meta-analysis. Econ J 120:F452–F477
Evers M, de Mooij R, van Vuuren D (2008) The wage elasticity of labour supply: a synthesis of empirical estimates. De
Economist 156(1):25–43
Fredriksson P, Holmlund B (2006) Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: a review of recent research. J Econ
Surv 20(3):357–86
Greenberg DH, Michalopoulos C, Robins PK (2003) “A meta-analysis of government-sponsored training programs“.
Industrial and Labour Relations Review 57:31–53
Grubb D, Puymoyen A (2008) “Long time series for public expenditure on labour market programmes“, OECD social,
employment and migration working papers, No. 73. OECD Publishing, www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers
Grubb D, Singh S, Tergeist P (2009) “Activation policies in Ireland”, OECD social, employment and migration working
paper No. 75. www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers
Hernanz V, Malherbet F, Pellizzari M (2004) “Take-up of welfare benefits in OECD countries: a review of the evidence”,
OECD social employment and migration working paper No. 17. OECD, Paris, www.oecd.org/els/workingpaper
Immervoll H (2009) “Minimum income benefits in OECD countries: policy design, effectiveness and challenges”, OECD
social, employment and migration working papers, No. 100. OECD Publishing, www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers
Immervoll H, Marianna P, Mira d’Ercole M (2004) Benefit coverage rates and household typologies: scope and
limitations of Tax benefit indicators”, OECD social, employment and migration working papers, No. 20. OECD, Paris,
www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers
Immervoll H, Kleven HJ, Kreiner CT, Saez E (2007) Welfare reform in European countries: a micro-simulation analysis.
Econ J 117(517):1–44
Immervoll H, Pearson M (2009) “A good time for making work pay? taking stock of in-work benefits and related
measures across the OECD”, OECD social, employment and migration working paper No. 81 And IZA policy paper
No. 3. www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/policypapers
Immervoll H, Richardson L (2011) “Redistribution policy and inequality reduction in OECD countries. What has changed
in two decades?” OECD social, employment and migration working paper No. 122 And IZA discussion paper series
at www.iza.org
Immervoll and Scarpetta IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012, 1:9 Page 20 of 20
http://www.izajolp.com/content/1/1/9OECD (2005) Labour market programmes and activation strategies: evaluating the impacts, employment outlook. OECD
Publishing, Paris
OECD (2006a) Employment outlook: boosting jobs and incomes. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2006b) General policies to improve employment opportunities for all, employment outlook. OECD Publishing,
Paris
OECD (2006c) Live longer, work longer. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2007) Benefits and wages, OECD indicators. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2010) Off to a good start? jobs for youth. OECD Publishing, Paris
OECD (2012) Employment outlook. OECD Publishing, Paris
Venn D (2012) “Eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits: quantitative indicators for OECD and EU countries”, OECD
social, employment and migration working paper No. 131. www.oecd.org/els/workingpapersdoi:10.1186/2193-9004-1-9
Cite this article as: Immervoll and Scarpetta: Activation and employment support policies in OECD countries. An
overview of current approaches. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2012 1:9.Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
